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ABSTRACT
Purpose. The main cause of distress in the majority of Nigerian banks is poor cor-
porate governance in the country. Corporate governance (CG) is a contemporary subject at-
tracting the consideration of the corporate world, practitioners, consultants, academia and 
society at large. As a result, this study explores the financial performance (FP) of money 
deposit banks (MDBs) in Nigeria as a result of corporate governance put in. It went on to 
investigate the impact of board size and composition, as well as the audit committee, on 
bank financial performance.
Methodology. A descriptive design method was adopted, while secondary data in 
the form of yearly financial reports of banks selected for the study were obtained and relevant 
documents via electronic search of databases. Descriptive statistics were used in analyzing 
the data and an econometric model of panel least square (PLS) regression test was employed 
for the study. 
Findings and Implication. The findings affirmed that the correlation between 
size of board of directors and bank performance was significant, however negative. The re-
sults of the study show that the board of directors (BOD) composition significantly influ-
ences the FP of MDBs. The study results further reveal that the correlation between size of the 
audit committee (AC) and FP of MDBs is significant and also a negative one. As a result, 
based on the empirical findings of the study, it is concluded that CG has a statistically sig-
nificant influence on the FP of Nigeria’s listed money deposit banks. Mechanisms such as 
the large size and composition of the board as well as the size of the audit committee encour-
age a negative impact on the FP. In line with the foregoing, the study recommended that an 
effort be made to improve CG, in the sense that the number of directors on board should be 
kept to a desirable level, and that the ratio of executive directors to non-executive directors, 
as well as the size of the audit committee, is kept at an optimal level.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The customary way of operation of corporate governance (CG) around the world 
has been identified as vital in all economic dealings, particularly in developing econ-
omies like Nigeria that are coming to maturity (Alashi, 2005). Globalisation versus 
technological advancement has made the financial domain in Nigeria to response 
to fresh products or services; and as such, those regulating the financial sectors are 
eager to evaluate and control the shifts in the upheaval (Sandeep, Patel and Lilicare, 
2002; Mansur and Tangl, 2018). Not to mention the rise in mergers and acquisitions 
in the banking sector. Regardless of these activities, there is a call for Nigeria to fos-
ter a healthy financial system, particularly in the banking sector, along with effective 
corporate governance. This affirms that a sound CG implies that effective utilisation 
of collective available wealth by controlling shareholders, translates into a more ef-
fective allotment of resources and efficient FPs. This is because stakeholders will 
want to reinvest their resources in that bank with clear CG practices, which ensures 
that the cost of capital is minimal and hence service as a determinant of firm finan-
cial performance (Qi et al., 2002).
According to Hanrahan, Ramsay and Stapledon (2001), one of the crucial parts 
in ameliorating corporate governance and firm value, is the ratio of executive direc-
tors to non-executive directors of the firm. In the sense that the firm’s value can be 
made better, due to the fiduciary roles carried out by the board, and this includes 
overseeing the activities of management and recruiting employees for the firm. In 
addition, the board appoints and monitors the operation of both internal and ex-
ternal auditors to increase the organisational value. Furthermore, the directors are 
able to settle disputes that might arise within the firm and, as such, help trim down 
the firm’s agency costs. The board of directors plays a crucial function by ensuring an 
increase in the firm’s value in the sense that they not only oversee the firm but also 
compel the firm’s manager to choose indifferent conclusions (Tomasic, Pentony and 
Bottomley, 2003; Paniagua, Rivelles, and Sapena, 2018).
In addition, the widely accepted belief regarding the desirable size of a board 
is that there is an inverse relationship in terms of the numbers of directors sitting 
and the firm’s general performance. This is based on the fact that the activities such 
as coordination and communication of tasks, as well as the potency of the decision-
making among the prominent directors is difficult and expensive when compared 
to the smaller numbers of directors (Belkhir, 2006; Mohan and Chandramohan, 
2018). Reducing the number of board directors to a specific number has been shown 
to improve the organization’s operations in all aspects. Notwithstanding, the advan-
tages of large numbers of directors in a firm carrying out oversight functions are out-
weighed by more inadequate communication and irregularities in making decisions. 
A review of literature has shown that the number of board size tends to give the same 
decision: A large board is probably not being efficient in essential matters of impor-
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tant subjects among themselves, in overseeing operations of the firm. According to 
Lipton and Lorsh, (1992), big board size is usually not effective and simple for CEOs 
to manage. And as such, this study considers the size in terms of number of directors 
on a firm’s board to be of major importance in the operation of every successful firm.
Furthermore, the concept of audit committees differs consistent with the goals, 
functions, and tasks assigned to them (audit committee). The conception is that the 
audit committee serves as a committee composed of non-executive directors in the 
establishment and the major reason behind having or forming the audit committee 
is to increase the level of auditing quality and monitoring the activities of the board 
of directors (Al-Thuneibat, 2006). According to Arun and Turner (2009), the au-
dit committee serves as a group of individual/persons from the board of directors’ 
members, and is responsible for retaining the independence of the auditor. Hence, 
this study is explored as a value added (eye opener) to the continuing discussion on 
the consideration of the existence of an association between corporate governance 
and FP of MDBs in Nigeria. Diverse and debatable findings as well as results have 
come up from prior studies, particularly those in the developed economies such as’ 
China, the United Kingdom, United States of America (USA), Australia, Italy, Korea, 
Germany, Sweden, Japan, Switzerland, Finland, the Netherlands and France amid 
many other economies.
1.1.  Problem Analysis 
In Nigeria, underprivileged corporate governance is recognized as one of the 
core elements in virtually recognized situations of bank distress in Nigeria. Accord-
ing to Soludo (2004), weak corporate governance is defined as excessive risk taking, 
feeble internal control structures, overriding of internal control measures, ignoring 
of prudent lending rules, and nonexistence of risk management functions, absence/
non adherence to authority limits, fraudulent practices, and insider ill-treatments. 
In line with this assertion, the Nigeria Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
reported that “corporate governance was at a rudimentary stage, as only about 40% 
of quoted companies, including banks, had recognized codes of corporate govern-
ance in place” (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2006). As a result, there is a breach in public 
(people) trust, particularly in commercial banks, especially if the criteria put in place 
are not checked by financial regulators.
Corporate governance has received increased attention because of high-profile 
scandals involving abuse of corporate power and, in some cases, alleged criminal 
activity by corporate officers. Despite, the fact that Code of Corporate Governance 
for Banks in Nigeria was issued to enhance the practices within the banking indus-
try, during the implementation of the code; it was observed that certain provisions 
could not be implemented by banks in view of their ambiguity and/or conflict with 
the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990. Furthermore, 
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in 2009, a joint CBN/NDIC examination that led to the removal of 5 CEOs of banks 
in the country revealed, amongst others, poor corporate governance practices in the 
institutions. There was also the need to update the code in order to align it with con-
temporary developments and international best practices. (Central Bank of Nigeria, 
2014).
Moreover, in tandem with the view of Sanusi (2010) where he asserted that 
“banking sector problems in Nigeria have been associated with corporate govern-
ance abuses within the amalgamated banks, which have therefore become a way of 
life in many areas of the sector”. Furthermore, Sanusi (2010) emphasized that cor-
porate governance in the financial sectors failed due to the fact that boards of direc-
tors in these financial sectors failed to adopt these practices on the basis that they are 
being misled by top management and involving themselves in securing un-assured 
loans, the majority of which come from depositors, and not providing moral justifi-
cations for impossibility. The vast number of CG studies focused on Nigeria, as well 
as the diversity of corporate governance codes within the poor institutional climate 
plagued by corruption, makes the case for Nigeria especially compelling. In certain 
cases, specific codes clash with one another, which would have ramifications for 
regulatory enforcement by Nigerian public companies (Adegbite 2013). Hence due 
to the above problem analysis, this paper set out to investigate corporate governance 
and financial performance (FP) of MDBs in Nigeria. The following research ques-
tions guided the study: board size effect on FP of MDBs in Nigeria; board composi-
tion influence on FP of MDBs in Nigeria; and the extent to which audit committees 
affect FP of MDBs in Nigeria.
Hypotheses Formulation. Based on the problem analysis above, the study for-
mulated the following hypotheses:
H01: The size of the board of directors will not have a significant relationship 
with FP of MDBs in Nigeria
H02: The composition of board of directions in MDBs will not have significant 
association with FP of MDBs in Nigeria
H03: The size of the audit committee will not have a significant relationship 
with FP of MDBs in Nigeria.
1.2. Study Scope and Delimitation 
The study centered on six (6) selected quoted banks in the Nigerian stock ex-
change (NSE): Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (UBN), Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (GTB), 
United Bank for Africa Plc (UBA), First Bank of Nigeria Plc (FBN), Zenith Bank In-
ternational Limited (ZB) and WEMA Bank Plc (WB) from 2007-2016. These banks 
were chosen using convenient sampling techniques based on the fact that the re-
searcher could only access the annual reports of the aforementioned banks as at the 
time of study. This is due to the fact that the issues concerning the transparency as 
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well as corporate governance are crucial in our banking sector today. In addition, the 
study covers three (3) vital components of corporate governance: Size of the board 
and their composition and as well as the size of the audit committee; Return on Assets 
was proxy as measures of the banks’ performance, while bank size and bank leverages 
serves as control variables. The data gotten were extracted the audited financial state-
ments of the banks i.e. GTB, FBN, UBA, ZB, UBN and WB, for a 10-year period that is, 
within the period of 2007-2016 which were downloaded from the banks respective 
corporate websites.
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Theoretical Review of Corporate Governance  
There are numerous theories that are relevant to corporate governance in un-
derstanding the relationships between different aspects of corporate governance. 
However, because of the tenets of these theories, the basic disciplines in which it lays 
on Economics, Management, Psychology, and Sociology, which are currently being 
practiced in Nigerian banks, the theoretical review embedded in this paper revolves 
around the three theories. These theories are Agency theory, Stakeholder theory and 
Stewardship theory (Yap, Selah, and Abessi, 2011).
2.1.1. Agency Theory 
The theory’s central premise is that large companies have separate ownership 
and power. In such companies, managers (agents) are employed to work for the own-
ers (principals) and make decisions on their behalf in order to optimize shareholder 
returns (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This theory tries to address the specific issues 
between the principal (shareholders) of a company and agents (managers).On the 
other hand, the agency theory of corporate governance views shareholders as the 
principals and management as their agents. Agents, on the other hand, will behave 
in their own best interests: as employee directors of a corporation, they will aim to 
optimize their cash compensation, work security, and other benefits, and will do 
nothing more than satisfy shareholders. Instead, they must be supervised and regu-
lated to ensure that the interests of the principals are preserved. The bulk of today’s 
corporate governance practice in Nigeria is based on this principle, especially in the 
Nigeria Banking Industry.
In relation to this extant theory, Habbash (2010) noted that “corporate govern-
ance enhances corporate performance by resolving agency problems through moni-
toring management activities, controlling self-centered behaviors of management 
and inspecting the financial reporting process”. On the other hand, in order to trim 
down the agency cost by positioning the disputing claims from the officials as well as 
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their shareholders via overseeing the operations and as well as using various corpo-
rate governance processes. Hence, these processes, which include board composi-
tions as well as audit committees, enable the shareholders to intimately oversee the 
operations of the top level of officials. Also, when the audit committees as well as the 
boards are not performing up to the task, the top official may take advantage of the 
situation to engage their personal interests. On the other hand, they are effective in 
their oversight functions. They tend to reduce the not too good attitude of the top of-
ficials by discovering the fraudulent activities they usually engage in (Sanda, Mukaila 
and Garba, 2005). In addition, Habbash (2010) noted that “the assumptions of agen-
cy theory, CG processes affect financial performance”. Consequently, the financial 
performance of banks can be improved by their improvement and transparency in 
the corporate governance processes. Board structure has to some great extent banked 
on the principles of agency theory, centering on the controlling roles played by the 
board. Hence, the corporate governance processes that are been centered upon in 
this paper consist of the size of the board and audit committee size.
2.1.2. Stakeholder Theory 
This is an annex of the theory of agency that anticipates the board of directors 
(BOD) to represent the concerns of the shareholders. According to this theory, the 
main goal of the firm is to dish out and organize stakeholders’ interests, that is the 
shareholders, government, suppliers, creditors, employees, customers, and the 
community. Furthermore, CG stakeholders can improve the outside environment, 
which contributes to the achievement of corporate goals. On the other hand, stake-
holders in corporate governance enable firms to consider not only the satisfaction of 
customers, but also the community and social organizations, resulting in a stable en-
vironment for long-term growth. In addition, Maher and Andersson (1999) posited 
that “the benefit of the stakeholder model lays emphasis on overcoming problems 
of underinvestment associated with opportunistic managerial behaviour and in en-
couraging active co-operation amongst stakeholders to ensure the long-term profit-
ability of the business firm”.
Stakeholder theory, as proclaimed by Kyereboah-Coleman, (2007), affirmed 
that “the best firms are the ones with committed suppliers, customers, employees 
and management. Recently, the stakeholder theory has received greater attention 
than earlier because researchers have recognized that the activities of a corporate 
entity impact on the external environment, requiring accountability of the organiza-
tion to a wider audience than simply its shareholders”. As such, companies are no 
longer the instruments to satisfy the shareholders alone but exist within society. It 
has responsibilities to the stakeholders. However, most researchers argue that it 
is an unrealistic task for the managers (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004; Sanda et al., 
2005). More so, the stakeholder theory precisely has not been subjected to extant/
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much prior empirical study. The common criticism of the stakeholder theory in the 
previous studies was its challenge to alignment of the stakeholders’ conflicting in-
terests as the difficulties have to do with accommodating different stakeholders with 
various needs and demands.
2.1.3. Stewardship Theory 
This theory was developed by Donaldson and Davis (1989) as a normative com-
plement to the agency theory of corporate governance. On the other hand, the stew-
ardship theory is based on sociology and psychology. Managers, according to the 
stewardship principle, are not guided by personal agendas, but rather are stewards 
whose motivations are aligned with the goals of their principals’ shareholders (Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). When the firm’s espoused principles are consist-
ent with the enacted values, this article argues that managers’ stewardship behavior 
results in outstanding corporate governance practices (Subramanian, 2018). Accord-
ing to the stewardship viewpoint, stewards (managers) are fulfilled and inspired when 
organizational performance is achieved, even if it means sacrificing personal objec-
tives (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). Furthermore, although the agency theory in-
dicates that separating the roles of board chair and CEO would protect shareholder 
interests, according to the stewardship principle, appointing the same person to the 
positions of board chair and CEO maximizes shareholder interests by giving the CEO 
more responsibility and autonomy as a steward in the company (Donalson and Davis 
1991).
2.2. Empirical Review of the Past Literature
Ozili (2021) conducted a recent literature review of recent corporate governance 
research in Nigeria. It identifies the recent advances and challenges in the literature 
and suggests some directions for future research. The findings from the literature 
review reveal that the board of directors is the most explored corporate governance 
determinant in the Nigerian corporate governance literature. Most studies focus on 
some corporate governance determinants, and ignore other corporate governance 
determinants in firms.
According to Asogwu (2016), Nigeria’s banking sector has seen corporate fail-
ures in the past due to lack of corporate governance structure. Rather than analytical 
views, his study offers a theoretical context and a model for understanding the prin-
ciple of corporate governance. This was accomplished by defining corporate govern-
ance theory, corporate governance model, corporate governance processes, and legal 
structures. The study concluded that the key setback to corporate governance in Ni-
gerian banks is non-adherence to principles.
In the works done by Fanta, Kemal and Waka (2013), their study assessed the 
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relationship between selected internal and external corporate governance mecha-
nisms and bank performance as measured by ROE and ROA. The study used a struc-
tured review of documents, and commercial banks’ financial data were collected cov-
ering the period 2005 to 2011. Board size and the existence of audit committees on 
the board had a statistically significant negative effect on bank performance.
Ajola, Amuda and Arulogum (2012) explored the influence of corporate gov-
ernance on bank’s performance in Nigeria within a five-year period and using 
correlation and regression analyses. They discovered that the size of the board and 
their firm’s financial performance exhibit significant but negative relationship. 
Bawa and Lubabah (2012) critically looked into the role of corporate governance and 
FP in Nigeria using 12 selected banks within the period of 5 years, i.e. 2006-2010. 
In their study, they also discovered that there exists a substantial but negative link 
between the size of the board of directors and their company profitability. Mean-
while, the research conducted by Akpan and Roman (2012) using selected 11 banks 
in Nigeria with the aid of regression analysis came to a conclusion that is consist-
ent with what Asuagwu (2013) discovered in his study, noting that “smaller board 
sizes positively and significantly enhance performance.” Furthermore, Yoshikawa 
and Phan (2003) in their study findings affirmed that “larger board sizes increase 
agency costs.”
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) reasoned that “a larger board is better than 
a smaller board size in that larger board sizes have the ability to push the managers 
to track lower costs of debt because creditors believe that such firms are more ef-
fective monitors of the accounting process”. This assertion corroborates the results 
of Adeusi, Akeke, Aribaba, and Adebisi (2013), where they noted that “an increased 
number of board sizes increases the performance of banks”. Uzma, Ummara, Sun-
das, Farhat, and Rabia, (2018) empirical study on the internal corporate governance 
and financial performance nexus using banks of Pakistan affirmed that Pakistan as 
a country has a comprehensive code of corporate governance. However, banks don’t 
make best use of proper implementation.
Kajola (2008) studied the role of corporate governance and its influences on 
the performance of organizations in the country (Nigeria). He did so by using listed 
banks within the period of 2000 and 2006. His findings show that the connection 
between the banks’ performance and their board composition is not significant. 
This finding is in tandem with the view of some studies such as Bhagat and Black, 
(2002), Sanda et al, (2005); Adeusi et al, (2013); Bawa and Lubabah (2013). In addi-
tion, Kajola (2008) asserted that “the performance of banks tends to be worse when 
there are more external board members”.  Nonetheless, Prakash and Martin (2001) 
found that a well-balanced ratio between executive directors and non-executive di-
rectors had a significant influence on the performance of these banks in their study 
of twenty-nine Nepalese banks from 2005 to 2011. Similarly, this view is in tandem 
with the view of Bawa and Lubabah (2013), Kamau (2018), as well as Ezzamel and 
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Watson (1993).
The corporate governance code emphasizes the composition of the board which 
should include members with qualitative, qualified, experienced and as well as prov-
en integrity (Bawa and Lubabah, 2013). Sanda, et al, (2005) reasoned that “the prop-
osition of board composition is to help reduce agency problems. From this position, 
a positive relationship is expected between firm performance and the proportion 
of outside directors sitting on the board”. Klein (2002) and Benerd, Chrauroue and 
Courteau (2004) reasoned that “the ability of the board of directors to monitor and 
advise a firm, depends on their influence, competence and experience as this will 
reduce fraud and increase performance.”
Furthermore, Poudel and Hovey (2012) noted that “shareholders’ interests are 
protected through the activities of audit committees because management may not 
always act in the interest of a corporation’s owners”. In addition to the aforemen-
tioned, larger audit committees assert that increasing the number of people involved 
in overseeing the operations of top officials brings or reduces any fraudulent act that 
might want to occur, and thus improves performance. However, other scholars such 
as Kajola, (2008), Hardwick, Adams and Zou (2003) documented that there exists 
no significant correlation between firm performance and their audit committee size. 
The focus of Prakash and Martin’s research is that it provided a reasonable intuition 
that both the interests of shareholders and financiers are protected by individuals 
who are difficult to control, particularly when they are large in number.
2.3. The Nexus between Corporate Governance and Financial 
Performance of Money Deposits Banks in Nigeria
One of the significant changes in the corporate governance history of Nige-
ria is the current treatment of the country’s apex bank, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN). Similarly, the constant fall that has been undergone in the sector is as a result 
of ineffective corporate governance and the merger and acquisitions of banks com-
pelled the CBN to enact new corporate governance outlines to the banks operating 
(in service) in Nigeria precisely in February 2006. According to CBN (2006), the 
framework known as the “Central Bank of Nigeria Code for Corporate Governance 
for Banks’ in Nigeria Post Consolidation” was created to “challenge the issue of poor 
corporate governance and create a sound banking system in the country.” The code 
has introduced more stringent requirements in the area of industry transparency, 
equity ownership, criteria for the appointment of directors, board structure and 
composition, accounting and auditing, risk management and financial reporting”.
According to Tandelilin, Kaaro, Mahadwartha and Supriyatna, (2007), the fun-
damental focus in most prior literature and discussion analysis in studies around the 
globe on corporate governance has been majorly focused on the structure of own-
ership and its processing. They further noted that “whether the kind of ownership 
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structure matters and what its effects on corporate governance are areas that raise 
concerns.” Corporate governance has been enlightened as that process which links 
them with among investors, financers, board of directors, shareholders, and the top 
officials in knowing the direction and performance of the corporation (Wheelen and 
Hunger, 2006; Kamau, 2018).
In addition, the main reason for bringing about a corporate governance system 
in Nigeria came via the functions of the Nigeria Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC). A Code of Best Practices for public firms in Nigeria was adopted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2003). It was noted that the code was 
done by choice and is considered to dig into business practices that are good, and of 
criteria for auditors, directors, and as well as the members of the boards.
2.4. The role of Corporate Governance in managing the challenges in the 
Nigerian Banking Industry
Though the merger and acquisition process in the banking sector in Nigeria has 
led to a lot of benefits, it failed to surmount the main disadvantage according to the 
corporate governance of these banks. This is exemplified by the vast rush in capital 
availability at a time when banks have no or little implementation of corporate gov-
ernance touchstones.
In the words of Sanusi (2010), “it is well known in the industry that since consoli-
dation, some banks have been engaging in unethical and potentially fraudulent busi-
ness practices and the scope and depth of these activities are documented in recent 
CBN examinations.” Governance missteps among the amalgamated banks have thus 
become the norm in the sector, enriching a few at the expense of investors/deposi-
tors. Sanusi (2010) showed that “corporate governance in many banks failed because 
boards ignored these practices for reasons, including being misled by executive man-
agement, participating themselves in obtaining un-secured loans at the expense of 
depositors and not having the moral justification to enforce good governance on bank 
management.” Also, the audit processes in most of the banks do not look fully into the 
fast declination of the growth and development of the nation’s economy and, as such, 
there is a need for promoting fast-growing provision against risk to assets.
As banks’ assets and modes of operation continue to grow, the boards of banks 
have mostly failed to fulfill their roles and have been lulled into a sense of eudemonia 
by the apparent yearly increases in their profits and size. In retrospect, the board of 
directors in some major banks did not have the necessary equipment to oversee their 
firms. While most CEOs of banks expect unquestioning obedience on the board, and 
as such, do not have the independence, hence, lack to make substantial decisions to 
protect the success of the bank.
The Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) revealed details on the extent of insider 
abuse in many countries’ banks, revealing that “CEOs set up Special Purpose Vehi-
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cles (SPVs) to lend money to themselves for stock price manipulations or the pur-
chase of estates all over the world.” For instance, one bank borrowed money and 
purchased private jets which the Apex bank later discovered were registered in the 
name of the CEO’s son. In another bank, the management set up 100 fake compa-
nies for the purpose of perpetrating fraud.” Sanusi (2010) also revealed that “thirty 
percent (30%) of the share capital of Intercontinental bank was purchased with cus-
tomer deposits. Afribank used depositors’ funds to purchase 80% of its initial pub-
lic offering (IPO). It paid N25 per share when the shares were trading at N11 on the 
NSE and these shares later collapsed to under N3.” Furthermore, according to CBN 
(2017), “the CEO of Oceanic bank controlled over 35% of the bank through special 
purpose vehicles/entities (SPVs) borrowing customer deposits.” As a result of the 
stock market’s decline, withdraw these customer deposits totaling N300 billion. As 
a result, the capital amassed by the so-called “mega banks” was fictitious capital, or 
run money deposits in short.
3.  RESEARCH METHODS
The study adopted a descriptive research design method. The time series data 
was gathered from the financial annual reports of chosen MDBs. The data used con-
sists of three major corporate governance constructs: board size, composition, and 
Audit committee, while ROA was used as a measure of bank performance because it 
measures how efficiently a company can manage its assets to produce profits. Bank 
size and bank leverages were used as control variables from 2007 to 2016. The sample 
size for this study was six (6) selected quoted MDBs on the Nigeria stock exchange, 
and it included: GTBank Plc, FBN Plc, UBA Plc, Zenith Bank Ltd, UBN Plc and WEMA 
Bank Plc, within the period of 2007-2016 (Appendix 1.). These banks were chosen 
using convenient sampling techniques based on the fact that the researcher could 
only access the annual reports of the aforementioned banks at the time of study. The 
data was collected mainly from published annual reports of these banks, i.e. down-
loaded from their corporate websites over the period of 2007-2016.
This study embedded in this paper an improved form in terms of the econo-




The explicit form of equation (1a) is written as
 1b)
 
log linearize equation (1b) we have
 (1c)
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where  
ROA  =  Return on Assets (used as proxy for bank performance) 
“BSize”  =         “Board Size of Banks”
BCom             =          Board Composition
AudSize  = Audit Committee Size of Banks 
Fsize  = Bank Size (Use as Control variable)
Fleverage         = Bank Leverage (Use as Control variable)
µ  = Error Term
β0  = the y-intercept of the model
β1, β2, …, β5 = Coefficient of the independents constructs.
4.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This part of the study shows the results analysis of panel least square and it has 
two parts. The first part is the descriptive statistics which summarizes the core fea-
tures of the study variables such as mean, median, min. and max. Standard deviation 
while the second section gives the regression results report of PLS estimation output 
of the regression model.
Table 1.: Descriptive Statistics
LOGROA LOGBSIZE LOGBCOMP LOGAUDSIZE LOGFSIZE LOGFLEV
Mean -2.627445 2.524365 -0.450552 1.468538 7.685203 2.527502
Median -2.743000 2.564900 -0.385700 1.386300 7.619500 2.590800
Maximum -1.452000 2.708100 -0.211500 1.791800 8.638200 2.901400
Minimum -4.106800 2.184900 -0.891600 1.098600 6.930700 1.957300
Std. Dev”. 0.729028 0.127799 0.152902 0.207299 0.469710 0.207917
Skewness” -0.029789 -0.921215 -0.927842 -0.332480 0.272210 -0.771034
Kurtosis” 1.592365 3.242794 3.080533 2.373759 2.297612 3.239822
Jarque-Bera 4.962467 8.633748 8.625115 2.085870 1.974355 6.088728
Probability 0.083640 0.013342 0.013399 0.352419 0.372627 0.047627
Sum -157.6467 151.4619 -27.03310 88.11230 461.1122 151.6501
Sum Sq. Dev. 31.35742 0.963627 1.379363 2.535411 13.01704 2.550545
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60
Source: Authors' Eview Output, 2017.
Looking at the Table 1., it shows the descriptive statistics indicating all the mean 
values for the construct are positive. The mean value for dependent variable Re-
turn on Asset (ROA) is 2.627445, while the mean values for the independent vari-
ables Board Size (BSize), Board Composition, (BCom), Audit committee Size (Aud-
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Size), Bank size (FSize) and Bank leverages (BLev) were computed to be 2.524365, 
-0.450552, 1.468538, 7.685203 and 2.527502. Also, the standard deviation of Return 
on Assets, (ROA), Board Size (BSize), Board Composition, (BComp), Audit commit-
tee Size (AudSize), Bank size (FSize) and Bank leverages (FLev) were calculated to be: 
0.729028, 0.127799, 0.152902, 0.207299, 0.469710, 0.207917.
The minimum values indicate the lowest point of the variables throughout 
the study period. The minimum values for ROA were -4.106800, while the mini-
mum values for independent variables i.e. Board Size (BSize), Board Composition, 
(BCom), Audit committee Size (AudSize), Bank size (FSize) and Bank leverages 
(BLev) were: 2.184900, -0.891600, 1.09860, 6.930700 and 1.957300 respectively. 
The maximum values also indicate the highest point of the variables throughout the 
study period. The maximum values for ROA was 1.452000, while the maximum val-
ues for independent variables i.e. Board Size (BSize), Board Composition (BCom), 
Audit committee Size (AudSize), Bank size (FSize) and Bank leverages (BLev) were: 
2.708100, -0.211500, 1.791800, 8.638200 and 2.901400 respectively. Skewness 
shows the asymmetry of the likelihood distribution of a real random variable about 
its mean. From the Table 1., the skewness of all variables excluding FSize is Negative, 
which means that all the variables except FSize are skewed to the left.
4.1. Empirical results
The study critically looked into the relationship between corporate governance 
and bank performance in Nigeria, within the period of 2010-2016. In an attempt 
to capture the essence of this study, Panel Least Square (PLS) was employed in this 
study. The significance of the t-statistics are the p-values highlighted by the predic-
tive software used as the basis for decision making. 
  (1c)
  (2)
Where   
ROA  =           Return on Assets proxied for bank performance
BSize  = Board Size of Banks
BCom               =         Board Composition
AudSize  = Audit Committee Size of Banks 
Fsize  = Bank Size (Use as Control variable)
Fleverage         = Bank Leverage (Use as Control variable)
µ  = Error Term
β0  = the y-intercept of the model
β1, β2, …, β5 = Coefficient of the independents construct.
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Table 2.: Panel Least Square Estimation
Variables Coefficients Std. Error ofthe Estimate t-Statistic Probability
LOGFSIZE 0.064385 0.070193 0.917258 0.3635
LOGBCOMP -0.141051 0.073977 -1.906687 0.0277
LOGAUDSIZE -0.316954 0.162062 -1.955757 0.0239
LOGFLEV 0.195341 0.156091 1.251455 0.2167
LOGBSIZE -0.733039 0.295741 -2.478649 0.0167
C -5.358236 0.826308 -6.484554 0.0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.920473 Mean dependent var -2.627445
Adjusted R-squared 0.904243 S.D. dependent var 0.729028
S.E. of regression 0.225595 Akaike info criterion 0.023991
Sum squared resid 2.493762 Schwarz criterion 0.407955
Log likelihood 10.28026 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.174181
F-statistic 56.71428 Durbin-Watson stat 1.986094
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Notes: Dependent Variable: LOGROA; Method: Panel Least Squares. 
Source: Authors Computation, 2017.
The Table 2. displays the panel least square results, the R-Square value, which 
is the ratio of changes in the dependent variable Return on Asset (ROA), which can 
be predicted from the constructs, size of boards (BSize), composition of boards, 
(BCom), size of the Audit committee (AudSize), Bank size (FSize) and Bank leverages 
(BLev) of the six selected banks. This value indicates that 92.1% of the changes in Re-
turn on Assets (ROA) scores can be predicted from Board Size (BSize), Board Com-
position, (BCom), Audit committee Size (AudSize), Bank size (FSize) and Bank lev-
erage (BLev). The adjusted R-square, on the other hand, attempts to provide a close 
value to the estimate; thus, the adjusted R2 value of 90.4% shows the actual changes 
in the Return on Assets (ROA), which is due to the change in construct understand-
ings; Board Size (BSize), Board Composition (BCom), Audit Committee Size (Aud-
Size), Bank Size (FSize), and Bank Levers (BLev).
Also, the estimate of the standard error, which can also be called the root mean 
square (RMS) error, is 0.060939. It indicates the existence of other variables and 
factors that can significantly influence the Return on Asset when not taking account 
of Board Size (BSize), Bank size (FSize) and Bank leverages (BLev). Furthermore, 
the Durbin-Watson statistics of 2.0 will show the absence of serial correlations or 
autocorrelation. As such, the DW value of 1.986094 is close to the benchmark, and 
this indicates that there is no serial correlation or autocorrelation problem of re-
gression in the models. The F-statistic (56.71428) is significant at 5% level since the 
probability of its value (0.0000) is less than the 0.05 significance level. This simply 
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implies that the test is statistically significant and the model can be used for further 
speculation.
H01: The size of the board of directors will not have a significant relationship with FP 
of MDBs in Nigeria
In the first proposition, without verification, it is presumed that the size of the board 
of directors will not have a significant relationship with FP of MDBs in Nigeria. In re-
lation to the data analysis, the t-statistics of Board Size is negative (-2.478649), with 
a p-value of 0.0167 which is significant at only 5%. This suggests that there exists an 
inverse correlation between the size of the board of directors (SBOD) and the FP of 
the selected MDBs. Based on these results, Ho1 was not supported and, as such, its 
alternate hypothesis, which states that the size of the board of directors has a signifi-
cant relationship with FP of MDBs in Nigeria, was supported. This means that when 
making financial decisions, the size of the board should not be considered, even if 
the size of the board is a desirable number.
H02: The compositions of board of directors in MDBs will not have a significant re-
lationship with FP of MDBs in Nigeria
In the second proposition, it is assumed that the composition of board of directors 
in MDBs will not have a significant relationship with FP of MDBs in Nigeria. From 
the analysis, the t-statistics of board composition is negative (-1.906687), with a p-
value of 0.0277, which is significant at only 5%. This indicates that there is also an 
inverse but significant correlation between the composition of board of directors of 
MDBs and their FP. Consequently, H02 was hence not supported while an alternate 
hypothesis which states that the composition of board of directors in MDBs has a 
significant relationship with FP of MDBs in Nigeria was held. This by extrapolation 
means that board composition must be put into consideration while taking financial 
decisions as it affects the performance of MDBs.
H03: The size of the audit committee will not have a significant relationship with FP 
of MDBs in Nigeria
Lastly, it is anticipated that the size of the audit committee will not have a significant 
relationship with FP of MDBs in Nigeria. From the analysis, the t-statistics of audit 
committee size is negative (-1.955757), with a p-value of 0.0239 which is significant 
at only 5%. This affirmed a significant negative relationship between audit commit-
tee size and the FP of the selected MDBs. As a result, H03 was not supported by the 
alternate hypothesis which states that the size of the audit committee has a significant 
relationship with FP of MDBs in Nigeria.
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4.2. Discussion of Findings 
The study assessed corporate governance and FP of MDBs, with particular ref-
erence to some MDBs in Nigeria. In line with the paper results, a significant negative 
relationship was found between board size and ROA was in line with the findings as 
reported by Loderer and Peyer (2002), and Muhammad (2018). They reported that 
there was a significant negative (-) link between board size and the performance of a 
firm. The findings of Conyon and Peck (1998) asserted that “a large board size leads 
to the free-rider problem where most of the board members play a passive role in 
monitoring the firm.” More so, the members of the board become affected in no 
adaptive disputes in the sense that the board is not in tune with board members and, 
as such, not achieving desirable goals, which in turn affects the development of the 
firm (Pathan, Skully and Wickramanayake, 2007). Meanwhile, the findings contra-
dict Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2005), as they asserted that there is “a positive 
relationship between a bank’s value and board size”. Similarly, the result above con-
tradicts the view of Zahra and Pearce (1989) who maintained that “a large board size 
brings more management skills and makes it challenging for the CEO to manipulate 
the board.”
Moreover, the study affirmed that there was a significant bond between board 
composition and FP of MDBs in Nigeria. This ultimately shows that the composition 
of the board should be taken into account or recognized in the process of executing 
financial decisions, whereas in the third result, it was acknowledged that there was 
a significant link between audit committee size and FP of MDBs. The result was in 
accordance with empirical studies conducted previously (Aldamen, et al., 2011). Ky-
ereboah-Coleman (2007) points out that “the size of the audit committee negatively 
influences the performance of Ghanaian banks.” This study corroborated the view, 
which asserted that the optimal size of an audit committee is efficient or adequate for 
the quality of financial reporting as well as to increase banks’ performance.
5.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study examines corporate governance and FP of MDBs in Nigeria, with 
specific reference to six (6) selected MDBs: GTB Plc, WB Plc, FBN Plc, UBN Plc, UBA 
Plc, as well as ZB Plc. Based on the panel least square results, the study concluded 
that there is a significant relationship between the size of the board of directors and 
the FP of MDBs in Nigeria. It was also clear that there was a significant relationship 
between the nature of the board of directors’ composition and the FP of MDBs in 
Nigeria, and that there was a statistical relationship between audit size and the FP of 
MDBs in Nigeria. Conclusively, corporate governance has a significant effect on the 
FP of enumerated MDBs in Nigeria. As a result, machineries such as the size of the 
board of directors, the ratio of executive directors to non-executive directors, and 
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the audit size committee, both individually and collectively, have a significant impact 
on the FP. The key policy implication of these findings is that regulatory authorities 
in Nigeria can spasmodically use corporate governance mechanisms as a policy gear 
to fix and regulate the going concern of the MDBs in the banking sectors in Nigeria.
The study made the following recommendations, which are in tandem with the 
empirical findings:
1. There is a need to concentrate on the stock ownership value of the members 
of the boards in order to enhance corporate governance, since empirical findings as-
sert that it has a positive connection to both the performance and the likelihood of 
correcting the management in banks that are not doing well.
2. People who advocate for board independence should put into considera-
tion that there exists a negative (-) link between high board independence and FP. 
As such, when clamoring for board independence in order to enhance performance, 
then the put in place might be a misleading effort. On the other hand, if the creation 
of the board independence is to discipline and carry out oversight functions on the 
bank managers that are not performing, then board independence creation is for a 
good and reliable cause.
3. In addition, independent directors can deliver an effective oversight func-
tion, if the financial regulatory bodies ensure that banks present extra disclosure of 
financial ties between directors and banks’ CEOs. Furthermore, banks may be per-
mitted to experiment with minor variations from the usual “super-majority inde-
pendent” board to having only 1 or 2 inside directors.
4. Necessary moves should be taken for banks to have compulsory abidance 
with the code of CG. And that an efficient legal structure that assigns the rights and 
duties of banks must be developed.
5. Finally, a unified corporate body should be set up. This body should be giv-
en the functions of gathering and ordering corporate governance information with 
proper indices to enable and foster research on corporate governance in the country.
This study has gone some way in researching the role in which corporate gov-
ernance played in influencing FPs of banks. Since this study concentrates on the 
banking sector in Nigeria, further studies could inquire into how to get a lighter un-
derstanding of the roles of corporate governance (CG) in other sectors in the country 
and how it affects their financial performance. Such studies could deal with the re-
semblances and departures of the roles of corporate governance in other sectors of 
the country.
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Appendix 1: Time Series Data of variables in Money Deposit Banks (2007-2016)
Bank YEAR LogROA LogBComp LogBSize LogAudSize LogFSize LogFLev
GTB 2007 -3.3116 -0.3711 2.5649 1.3863 7.3904 2.5908
GTB 2008 -3.3123 -0.3425 2.6391 1.6094 7.5519 2.7298
GTB 2009 -3.1341 -0.3567 2.6391 1.3863 7.6623 2.6123
GTB 2010 -3.3496 -0.3711 2.5649 1.0986 6.9878 2.4186
GTB 2011 -3.3873 -0.4155 2.4849 1.0986 7.3288 2.1078
GTB 2012 -2.8771 -0.3711 2.5649 1.0986 7.3904 2.0643
GTB 2013 -3.1033 -0.3857 2.6391 1.3863 7.5519 2.5908
GTB 2014 -3.1281 -0.3711 2.6391 1.3863 7.6623 2.7298
GTB 2015 -3.1917 -0.4005 2.6391 1.6094 8.3871 2.6123
GTB 2016 -2.9337 -0.3011 2.7081 1.3863 8.6382 2.5915
Wema 2007 -2.0084 -0.5440 2.5649 1.6094 7.8417 2.3795
Wema 2008 -1.7585 -0.6162 2.6391 1.3863 8.0235 2.6741
Wema 2009 -1.8819 -0.6162 2.5649 1.6094 8.1772 2.9014
Wema 2010 -1.7841 -0.8916 2.4849 1.6094 6.9307 1.9573
Wema 2011 -2.1866 -0.7765 2.5649 1.3863 7.3333 2.3795
Wema 2012 -2.1029 -0.8440 2.5649 1.6094 7.6195 2.6741
Wema 2013 -2.0084 -0.6162 2.6391 1.3863 7.8417 2.9014
Wema 2014 -1.7585 -0.6162 2.5649 1.3863 8.0235 2.5471
Wema 2015 -1.8819 -0.6539 2.6391 1.6094 8.1772 2.7160
Wema 2016 -1.4520 -0.6349 2.6391 1.3863 8.3104 2.7305
FBN 2007 -3.4013 -0.3567 2.3026 1.3863 7.5519 2.6101
FBN 2008 -3.1800 -0.3425 2.3026 1.3863 7.6623 2.6603
FBN 2009 -3.1370 -0.3425 2.4849 1.6094 8.2030 2.5177
FBN 2010 -3.2249 -0.3711 2.4849 1.7918 7.1929 2.5787
FBN 2011 -3.4673 -0.3425 2.4849 1.6094 7.2631 2.8214
FBN 2012 -3.7854 -0.3567 2.3026 1.7918 7.3288 2.6101
FBN 2013 -3.5370 -0.3425 2.3026 1.3863 7.3904 2.6603
FBN 2014 -3.3382 -0.3425 2.4849 1.3863 7.5519 2.5177
FBN 2015 -3.1725 -0.3425 2.6391 1.6094 7.6623 2.4114
FBN 2016 -3.0303 -0.3857 2.4849 1.6094 8.2030 2.2925
UBA 2007 -3.7247 -0.5978 2.4849 1.3863 6.9307 2.2976
UBA 2008 -3.4489 -0.6349 2.5649 1.6094 7.3333 2.4186
UBA 2009 -3.2330 -0.6349 2.5649 1.6094 7.6195 2.5265
UBA 2010 -4.1068 -0.3011 2.4849 1.7918 8.3871 2.1576
UBA 2011 -3.7247 -0.5978 2.5649 1.3863 8.6382 2.2976
UBA 2012 -3.4489 -0.6349 2.5649 1.6094 6.9307 2.4186
UBA 2013 -3.2330 -0.6349 2.7081 1.6094 7.3333 2.5265
UBA 2014 -3.0555 -0.6349 2.4849 1.7918 7.6195 2.6239
UBA 2015 -2.9048 -0.4943 2.7081 1.6094 7.8417 2.7127
UBA 2016 -2.7739 -0.5276 2.6391 1.6094 8.3871 2.7942
Zenith 2007 -1.7513 -0.3425 2.4849 1.7918 6.9307 2.5455
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Zenith 2008 -1.7196 -0.3857 2.3026 1.0986 7.3333 2.6005
Zenith 2009 -1.6888 -0.3011 2.4849 1.0986 7.6195 2.6525
Zenith 2010 -1.8181 -0.3567 2.4849 1.7918 8.6382 2.4257
Zenith 2011 -1.7841 -0.3425 2.4849 1.0986 6.9307 2.4874
Zenith 2012 -1.7513 -0.3857 2.3026 1.6094 7.3333 2.5455
Zenith 2013 -1.7196 -0.3425 2.4849 1.7918 7.6195 2.6005
Zenith 2014 -1.6888 -0.3857 2.3979 1.0986 7.8417 2.6525
Zenith 2015 -1.6589 -0.3011 2.4849 1.0986 8.0235 2.7020
Zenith 2016 -1.6299 -0.5978 2.6391 1.3863 8.1772 2.7492
UNION 2007 -2.1123 -0.2124 2.5649 1.0986 7.3904 2.0643
UNION 2008 -2.1211 -0.3857 2.6391 1.3863 7.5519 2.5908
UNION 2009 -2.1202 -0.3711 2.6391 1.3863 7.6123 2.7298
UNION 2010 -2.1901 -0.2115 2.6391 1.6094 8.3871 2.6123
UNION 2011 -2.5370 -0.3425 2.3026 1.3863 7.3904 2.6603
UNION 2012 -2.3012 -0.3425 2.4849 1.3863 7.5519 2.5177
UNION 2013 -2.1195 -0.3425 2.6391 1.6094 7.6623 2.4114
UNION 2014 -2.1303 -0.3857 2.1849 1.6094 8.2030 2.2925
UNION 2015 -2.7121 -0.3857 2.1849 1.3863 6.9307 2.2976
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